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Abstract
This paper studies an untrusted relay channel, in which the destination sends artificial noise simul-
taneously with the source sending a message to the relay, in order to protect the source’s confidential
message. The traditional amplify-and-forward (AF) scheme shows poor performance in this situation
because of the interference power dilemma: providing better security by using stronger artificial noise
will decrease the confidential message power from the relay to the destination. To solve this problem, a
modulo-and-forward (MF) operation at the relay with nested lattice encoding at the source is proposed.
For this system with full channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT), theoretical analysis shows
that the proposed MF scheme approaches the secrecy capacity within 1/2 bit for any channel realization,
and hence achieves full generalized security degrees of freedom (G-SDoF). In contrast, the AF scheme
can only achieve a small fraction of the G-SDoF. For this system without any CSIT, the total outage
event, defined as either connection outage or secrecy outage, is introduced. Based on this total outage
definition, analysis shows that the proposed MF scheme achieves the full generalized secure diversity
gain (G-SDG) of order one. On the other hand, the AF scheme can only achieve a G-SDG of 1/2 at
most.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of wireless transmission creates significant security concerns, and phys-
ical layer techniques can be used in part to address these concerns. The theoretical basis for
physical-layer security can be traced back to Shannon’s work on perfect secrecy [1], and to
subsequent work by Wyner [2], Leung et al. [3], and others on the wire-tap channel. The basic
idea of physical-layer security is to exploit the destination’s advantages (e.g, better channel
quality) over the eavesdropper. More recent works have investigated this problem in fading
channels, including analyses of the fading secrecy capacity [4], [5] and the secrecy outage
probability [6], [7]. On the other hand, new coding and modulation schemes have been proposed
to achieve physical-layer security, including Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes in [8] and
[9], nested lattice codes in [10] and [11], and nested polar codes in [12] and [13].
In recent years, several extended models of the wire-tap channel have been studied and one
of these is the untrusted relay channel. In the untrusted relay channel, the source relies on a
relay node to forward information to the destination, while keeping the transmitted information
confidential from the relay. An example is the two-way untrusted relay channel with two-phase
physical-layer network coding [14], in which the superimposed signals at the relay protect each
other’s information with minimal rate loss compared to capacity [15], [16]. Similar ideas have
been applied in the one-way untrusted relay channel in which the destination artificially transmits
some interference to the relay while the source is transmitting. Depending on the processing at
the relay, such schemes can be classified into two categories. The first category is amplify-and-
forward (AF), in which the relay simply amplifies the received signal under its power constraint
and then forwards it to the destination [17]–[19]. Although AF is simple to implement, its
performance is severely limited by the interference power dilemma: more power of the relay
is wasted on forwarding the interfering signal (which is useless to the destination) when the
destination transmits with larger power to protect the confidential message; alternatively the
confidential message is less well protected when the destination transmits with smaller power.
The other category is decode-and-forward (DF) [20], in which both source signal and interference
signal are encoded by lattice codes and arrive at the relay in perfect synchrony1, followed by
channel decoding to obtain the noiseless network code produced by this signal. The DF scheme
1Perfect synchronization here refers to the synchronization of signal amplitude, carrier frequency and carrier phase.
3performs better than the AF scheme in the high SNR region but performs worse in the low SNR
region, despite the cost of perfect synchronization. Schemes extending these ideas to multiple
channels and fading channels can be found in many works, such as [21] and [22].
To counter the shortcomings of these existing techniques and inspired by the modulo-lattice
additive noise (MLAN) channel [23] in which modulo processing at the receiver loses very
little information, here we propose a novel modulo-and-forward (MF) scheme at the relay. In
this scheme, the confidential message from the source node is encoded with a nested lattice
code [10] while the artificial interference message from the destination is Gaussian. When the
two messages arrive at the relay node simultaneously, the relay maps the superimposed signal
to a new signal with a modulo operation according to the source lattice. As a result, the total
power of the new message is reduced to that of the source lattice, with almost no loss of useful
information. In this way, the proposed MF scheme solves the interference power dilemma of the
AF scheme by relaying a signal with only the source power, without relation to the interference
power. Moreover, MF does not require perfect synchronization as in the DF scheme.
We analyze the secure performance of this MF scheme for two different cases. For Gaussian
channels with full channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT), our analysis shows that the
MF scheme approaches the secrecy capacity of the untrusted relay channel within 1/2 bit for all
channel realizations; hence it achieves the full generalized secure degrees of freedom (G-SDoF),
while the AF scheme can achieve only a small fraction of the G-SDoF. The achievable secrecy
rate of MF is also better than that of DF, which as noted above requires fine synchronization.
For fading channels without any CSIT, we characterize the total outage probability, which
includes the connection outage probability at the destination and the secrecy outage probability
at the relay node [7]. Beyond achieving a smaller outage probability as expected, the MF scheme
achieves essential improvement over the AF scheme. Defining the generalized secure diversity
as the rate with which the total outage probability goes to zero in the high SNR region, our
analysis shows that the MF scheme achieves full diversity gain of 1 as long as the ratio of the
destination signal power to the source signal power goes to infinity. The AF scheme, however,
can only achieve a diversity gain of 1/2 at most, due to the interference power dilemma.
The contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) The MF Scheme: We propose the lattice code based modulo-and-forward scheme for the
untrusted relay channel. This scheme is of practical interest since it only needs symbol level
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Fig. 1. System model for the untrusted relay channel based on lattice coding.
time synchronization and low complexity processing to obtain much better performance
than other schemes.
2) Analysis of the Secure Capacity and G-SDoF in Gaussian Channels: In Gaussian
channels with full CSIT, we prove that the MF scheme approaches the secrecy capacity
within one-half bit for any channel realization. Hence, the MF scheme achieves the full
G-SDoF, while the AF scheme only achieves a very small fraction of the G-SDoF.
3) Analysis of the Secure Diversity in Fading Channels: In fading channels without CSIT,
the MF scheme achieves the full generalized secure diversity gain (G-SDG) value of 1,
while the AF scheme only achieves a G-SDG of 1/2 due to the interference power dilemma.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the detailed untrusted
relay model and the notation used therein. For the proposed modulo-and-forward scheme, Section
III elaborates the encoding process at the source node, the forwarding process at the relay node
and the decoding process at the destination node. Under the assumption of full CSIT, Section IV
analyzes the achievable rate and the G-SDoF of the MF scheme, with a comparison to the AF
and DF schemes. Under the assumption of no CSIT, Section V analyzes the connection outage
and secrecy outage probabilities, as well as the system secure diversity gain. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper.
5II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 shows the system model for the considered untrusted relay channel, where the source
S needs to transmit a confidential message to the destination D with R working as a relay. All
nodes are equipped with single antennas, and operate in a time-division half-duplex mode. In
this setting, although the source relies on the relay to forward the message, it does not trust the
relay and would like to keep the confidential information secret from the relay. This model can
find application in many practical scenarios such as renting a satellite from a third party to relay
confidential messages.
To prevent eavesdropping at R, an artificial interference scheme is proposed. Specifically,
the destination D sends a signal to interfere with reception at the relay, while the source is
transmitting to the relay. Then, the relay sends the corrupted source signal to the destination,
where it can be recovered since the destination has full information about the interfering signal.
This two phase transmission is similar to physical layer network coding as described in [14].
The data transmission process is detailed as follows.
Before transmitting the signal, the source needs to encode its information with a secure
encoding scheme, such as those described in [2], [10] and [12]. Essentially, all the schemes
can be described as follows. First, the length-L1 binary confidential message v is combined with
a random sequence and mapped to a new binary source message w of length L2 ≥ L1. This is
a one-to-one mapping, the rule for which is known to all nodes, although the random sequence
itself is not known to either R or D. The sequence w is then channel encoded to a length-N
message xs to combat the channel degradation at the destination.
After secure encoding at the source, the data transmission will operate in two phases as shown
in Fig. 1. Specifically, the first phase is a multiple access transmission, in which the source S
transmits xs with power Ps to the relay, and at the same time, D transmits a Gaussian interference
signal xd with power Pd. Hence the relay receives a superimposed signal
yr = h1xs + h2xd + nr, (1)
where hi ∼ CN (0, εi) denotes the instantaneous channel coefficient of the i-th hop (i = 1, 2) in
the multiple access phase, and nr ∼ CN (0, σ2) is additive white Gaussian noise at the relay.
Recall that the relay is untrusted, and we hope to keep the confidential information secret
from the relay. Therefore, the relay must not be able to correctly decode w from yr. On the
6other hand, the relay is willing to forward the message to the destination. So it will process yr
to make the transmission to D more efficient. We denote the message sent from the relay by
xr, with the same average power constraint Ps2.
The second phase is a point-to-point forwarding transmission, where R transmits xr to the
destination D. As a result, the received signal at D can be expressed as
yd = h2xr + nd, (2)
where nd ∼ CN (0, σ2) is additive white Gaussian noise at the destination and the corresponding
channel coefficient is also h2 under the assumption of reciprocity.
Let gi = |hi|2 be the instantaneous channel gain of the i-th hop (i ∈ {1, 2}). For an amplify-
and-forward relay scheme, xr = τyr with the normalizing coefficient τ =
√
Ps
Psg1+Pdg2+σ2
.
Although the artificial interference xd protects the confidential message from eavesdropping
at R, it also degrades the performance of the useful information at the destination since it
decreases the normalizing coefficient τ via the term Pd therein. Better protection with larger Pd
also consumes more power at the relay, which is the interference power dilemma, as noted above.
To solve this dilemma, i.e., to overcome the detrimental effects of the artificial interference and
keep its beneficial effects at the same time, we now propose a modulo-and-forward scheme as
detailed in the next section.
III. MODULO-AND-FORWARD SCHEME
In the amplify-and-forward scheme, a good part of the relay’s power is used to convey the
interference, which is totally useless for the destination D. To counter this problem, we propose
a modulo-and-forward scheme, in which the relay processes yr with a modulo operation before
forwarding it. This scheme is detailed as follows.
A. Lattice Encoding at S
We consider the nested lattice coding scheme of [10]. Let (Λ,Λ0,Λ1) be properly designed
nested lattices such that Λ1 ⊂ Λ0 ⊂ Λ, and their associated fundamental Voronoi regions are
denoted by V1,V0, and V , respectively. The Voronoi regions are selected such that the average
2 There is no loss of generality with this assumption since the transmit power can be combined into the channel coefficient
in the second phase.
7power of points in V1 is Ps. All points in (Λ,Λ0,Λ1) are length-L vectors. We define the
codebook C = {Λ ∩ V0} and there is a one-to-one mapping between each codeword in C and
each confidential message v. Therefore, the cardinality of C is |C| = 2L1 . We then define another
codebook C′ = {Λ0∩V1} and the cardinality of this codebook is |C′| = 2L2−L1 . Therefore, there
is a one-to-one mapping between any codeword in C′ and any length-(L2−L1) binary sequence.
For any message v, the source selects the corresponding codeword cm in C, and then it
generates a random bit sequence of length L2−L1, which is mapped to one codeword bm in C′.
Before transmission, the source S calculates the nested lattice codeword as xs = (cm+ bm+u)
mod Λ1, equal to (am + u) mod Λ1, where u is a dither vector uniformly distributed over
V1 and am = (cm + bm) mod Λ1. Obviously, the average power of xs is still Ps.
B. Modulo Operation at R
After the first phase transmission, the relay R receives yr = h1xs + h2xd + nr. Instead of
forwarding yr directly as in the AF scheme, the relay scales the received signal3 and reduces it
modulo Λ1, i.e.,
xr = [β
1
h1
yr + u1] mod Λ1
= [β(xs + h2/h1xd + nr/h1) + u1] mod Λ1, (3)
where u1 is a random dither vector uniformly distributed over V1 and is known by all the nodes,
and β is chosen as Ps
Ps+σ2/g1
to minimize interference at the destination as explained later.
According to the lemma in [23], xr is also uniformly distributed over V1 and its average
power is Ps. As it is assumed that the relay has the same transmit power constraint as Ps, it can
directly forward the resulting signal xr to the destination D.
C. Lattice Decoding at D
After receiving the signal yd of (2), the destination D exploits inflated lattice decoding [23].
Specifically, D multiplies the received signal by a coefficient α, and then cancels both the
3With equalization at the relay, our modulo-and-forward scheme can be applied to both the in-phase and quadrature phase
signals. For simplicity, we focus only on the in-phase signal processing here.
8self-interference xd and the dither vector u, u1 as
y =
( α
h2
yd − βh2
h1
xd − u− u1
)
mod Λ1, (4)
where α and β are scaling factors to be selected to minimize the power of the residual interference
plus noise. By substituting (2) and (3) into (4) and applying processing similar to that in [23]
and [24], we can write y as
y =
(
α(xr +
nd
h2
)− βh2
h1
xd − u− u1
)
mod Λ1
=
(
xr + (α− 1)xr + αnd
h2
− βh2
h1
xd − u− u1
)
mod Λ1
=
(
βxs + β
nr
h1
+ (α− 1)xr + αnd
h2
− u
)
mod Λ1
=
(
xs + (β − 1)xs + βnr
h1
+ (α− 1)xr + αnd
h2
− u
)
mod Λ1
=
(
am + (α− 1)xr + (β − 1)xs + βnr
h1
+ α
nd
h2
)
mod Λ1, (5)
where the residual interference plus noise becomes
(
(α−1)xr+(β−1)xs+β nrh1 +αndh2
)
, with an
upper bound on the variance of (1−α)2Ps+(1−β)2Ps+α2σ2/g2+β2σ2/g1. We then select α
and β to minimize this upper bound on the variance4. It is easy to see that the optimal values of
the scaling factors are α = Ps
Ps+σ2/g2
and β = Ps
Ps+σ2/g1
. As a result, the equivalent noise variance
of the post-modulo signal at D becomes
σ2e = min
{
Ps,
Psσ
2
g1Ps + σ2
+
Psσ
2
g2Ps + σ2
}
, (6)
and we ignore the case of σ2e = Ps hereafter for simplicity.
Then, the decoder at the destination can use Euclidean lattice decoding to decode am as
aˆm = QV(y) mod Λ1, (7)
where QV(x) is the nearest neighbor quantizer defined as QV(x) = argmina∈Λ ||x − a||. aˆm
can then be mapped to an estimate of w directly (note that w includes both information of
confidential message v and the random generated information.).
As proved in [23], the error probability Pr(am 6= aˆm) goes to zero as long as the total
transmission rate Rd = L2/L is less than the direct channel capacity Cd = 12 log(Ps/σ
2
e). We
4xr, xs and am are independent of each other with the random dither vector u and u1 as in [23].
9use Cr =
1
2
log(1 + g1Ps/(g2Pd + σ
2)) to denote the channel capacity for the untrusted relay
(with interference). As proved in [10], this nested scheme can guarantee that the untrusted relay
obtains no information about the confidential message as long as the confidential rate Rs = L1/L
is less than the secrecy capacity [Cd − Cr]+, where [x]+ = max(0, x).
By decreasing the power of the effective signal yr/h1 from Ps+ g2g1Pd+
σ2
g1
to Ps, the MF scheme
can substantially improve the performance of the untrusted relay channel. The performance of
MF is analyzed in the next two sections.
IV. SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS WITH FULL CSIT
In this section, we analyze the capacity performance on the untrusted relay channel, in terms
of the secrecy capacity and the generalized secure degrees of freedom, under the assumption of
full CSIT. This section consists of four parts: Part A presents the definition of secrecy rate and
generalized secure degrees of freedom; Part B presents upper bounds for the secrecy rate and
G-SDoF for any forwarding protocol; Part C calculates the achievable secrecy rate and G-SDoF
of the MF scheme; and finally Part D provides a comparison with the AF and DF forwarding
schemes.
A. Secrecy Rate and G-SDoF
When the channel varies slowly and the channel information can be fed back to the transmitter,
all the channel information can be pre-known by the transmitter. In this case, the transmitter can
carefully select the confidential message rate Rs and the mixed message rate Rd respectively,
such that the confidential message is correctly and securely transmitted to the destination at the
maximal rate. In this case, the achievable secrecy capacity region has been derived in [2] and
is given by
Rs ≤ Rd ≤ Cd 0 ≤ Rs ≤ [Cd − Cr]+, (8)
where Cd and Cr are the channel capacities from the source to the destination (via the relay) and
the channel capacity from source to the relay, respectively. In this case, therefore, the secrecy
capacity is the most important factor indicating the system performance.
In the high SNR region, degrees of freedom is a good metric to analyze the system rate
performance. Analogous to the generalized degrees of freedom definition in [25], we further
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define the generalized secure degrees of freedom as
SD(ρ) = lim sup
SNR→∞
Rs(SNR, ρ)
log(SNR)
, (9)
where SNR is defined as Ps/σ2 and ρ = log(INR)/ log(SNR), with INR = Pd/σ2 being the
interference-to-noise ratio.
B. Upper Bound on Secrecy Rate and G-SDoF
We firstly present an upper bound on the secrecy rate for any possible forwarding protocol
and processing at the relay node. As proved in [2] and [3], the secrecy rate for a wiretap
channel is upper bounded by [Cd − Cr]+. In our system, the destination channel capacity Cd is
upper bounded by the minimum capacity of the two-hop channel based on the cut-set bound,
which is Cd ≤ 12 log(1 + min{g1, g2}Psσ2 ). On the other hand, the capacity of the relay channel,
Cr =
1
2
log(1 + g1Ps
g2Pd+σ2
), is achievable with properly selected lattices. As a result, an upper
bound on the secrecy rate for this two-hop channel is given by
U =
[
1
2
log
(
1 + min{g1, g2}Ps
σ2
)
− 1
2
log(1 +
g1Ps
g2Pd + σ2
)
]+
. (10)
We secondly present an upper bound for the G-SDoF. Substituting the upper bound in (10)
to the definition in (9), we can easily obtain an upper bound on the G-SDoF as
SDu(ρ) = lim sup
SNR→∞
1
2
log(1 + min{g1, g2}Psσ2 )− 12 log(1 + g1Psg2Pd+σ2 )
log(SNR)
=
1
2
lim sup
SNR→∞
log
(
SNRmin(g1, g2)
)
− log
(
1 + g1SNR
g2INR
)
log(SNR)
=
1
2
lim sup
SNR→∞
[
1−
log
(
1 + g1
g2
SNR1−ρ
)
log(SNR)
]
=


ρ/2, If 0 ≤ ρ < 1
1/2, If 1 ≤ ρ
. (11)
The G-SDoF must be no more than the generalized degrees of freedom without a security
constraint, which is at most 1/2 in our two-hop single antenna system due to the two-phase
transmission. And this best secure DoF may be achieved when the transmission power of the
destination is no less than that of the source, as shown in (11).
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C. Achievable Secrecy Rate and G-SDoF with MF
We now calculate the achievable secrecy rate and G-SDoF for the modulo-and-forward scheme.
1) Achievable Secrecy Rate: With reference to (6), a good nested lattice code can achieve the
following rate to the destination:
Rd =
1
2
log
(Ps
σ2e
)
=
1
2
log
( 1
σ2
g1Ps+σ2
+ σ
2
g2Ps+σ2
)
≥ 1
2
log
(1
2
+
Ps
σ2
g1g2
g1 + g2
)
. (12)
From (1), we can compute the maximum information obtained by the relay. With the as-
sumption that the relay knows all the nested lattice codebook information and the channel state
information to detect the combined information w, the maximal information rate is
Rr =
1
2
log
(
1 +
Psg1
Pdg2 + σ2
)
. (13)
Then, the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed modulo-and-forward scheme is given by
Rs ≥ 1
2
[
log
(1
2
+
Ps
σ2
g1g2
g1 + g2
)
− log
(
1 +
Psg1
Pdg2 + σ2
)]+
. (14)
From (14), we can see that the artificial noise power Pd only helps to improve the secrecy rate
with almost no detrimental effect on the transmission from S to D in our modulo-and-forward
scheme. When Pd goes to infinity, Rs can approach the upper bound of 12 log
(
1/2 + Ps
σ2
g1g2
g1+g2
)
.
Therefore, the MF scheme solves the interference power dilemma of the AF scheme.
We now calculate the gap between the upper bound and the achievable rate in the non-trivial
regime, i.e., U > 0 and Rs > 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that g1 ≤ g2. Then, we
obtain the gap as
U − Rs ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
g1 + g2 + 2g
2
1Ps/σ
2
g1 + g2 + 2g1g2Ps/σ2
)
≤ 1/2, (15)
which goes to zero as g1/g2 goes to zero in the high SNR region. In other words, when the
ratio between the two-hop channel gains, g1 and g2, becomes very large or small, the achievable
rate of the modulo-and-forward scheme approaches the upper bound for small noise variance.
In summary, we have the following theorem,
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Theorem 1: The modulo-and-forward scheme achieves a secrecy rate Rs of (14), which is
within one-half bit of the secrecy capacity for all channel realizations5.
2) Achievable G-SDoF: Now we characterize the G-SDoF of the MF scheme. Substituting
(14) into the definition of G-SDoF in (9), we have
SDmf(ρ) ≥ lim sup
SNR→∞
1
2
log
(
1/2 + Ps
σ2
g1g2
g1+g2
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 + Psg1
Pdg2+σ2
)
log(SNR)
=
1
2
lim sup
SNR→∞
log
(
SNR g1g2
g1+g2
)
− log
(
1 + SNRg1
INRg2
)
log(SNR)
=
1
2
lim sup
SNR→∞
1−
log
(
1 + g1
g2
SNR1−ρ
)
log(SNR)
=


ρ/2, If 0 ≤ ρ < 1
1/2, If 1 ≤ ρ
. (16)
As an upper bound on G-SDoF, SDu(ρ) ≥ SDmf (ρ) holds. On the other hand, SDmf (ρ) ≥
SDu(ρ) is obtained from the equation above. Hence we can conclude that SDmf (ρ) = SDu(ρ)
exactly. Thus, we have the following theorem,
Theorem 2: The modulo-and-forward scheme achieves the full generalized secrecy degrees of
freedom for the untrusted relay channel.
D. Comparison with AF and DF Schemes
This subsection compares the MF scheme with the AF scheme in terms of secrecy rate and
the generalized secure degrees of freedom.
1) Secrecy Rate Comparison with AF: For the AF scheme, the relay node will amplify the
received signal in (1) with a coefficient τ =
√
Ps/(g1Ps + g2Pd + σ2) before sending it to the
destination D. As a result, the destination receives the signal
y′d = τh2yr + nd
= τh1h2xs + τh
2
2xd + τh2nr + nd. (17)
5 The above analysis ignores the case that U > 0 and Rs < 0. In fact, it is easy to verify that U < 1/2 when Rs < 0.
Therefore, this theorem is true for all channel realizations.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate versus Pd, where Ps =
√
Pd and σ2 = 1.
Since the destination has full knowledge of xd and the channel coefficients, it can completely
remove the self-interference term τh22xd, and the resulting SNR of the target signal becomes
SNRAF =
P 2s g1g2
σ2[Psg1 + Psg2 + Pdg2 + σ2]
. (18)
Then, we can calculate the secrecy rate of the traditional AF scheme as [26]
Raf =
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
P 2s g1g2
σ2[Psg1 + Psg2 + Pdg2 + σ2]
)− 1
2
log
(
1 +
Psg1
Pdg2 + σ2
)]+
. (19)
By comparing RAF with Rs in (14), it is easy to verify that the secrecy rate of the MF scheme,
Rs, is always larger than that of the traditional AF scheme. Specifically, consider the case in
which σ2 → 0, Pd → ∞, with Pd ∗ σ2 and other parameters constant. Then RAF in (19) is a
constant while the rate Rs in (14) increases without bound. In other words, the improvement of
the MF scheme over the AF scheme can be arbitrarily large.
In Fig. 2, we plot the achievable secrecy rate of the MF and AF schemes, as well as the upper
bound in (10) versus transmission power Pd. In particular, we set g1 = g2 = 1, Ps =
√
Pd and
14
σ = 1. The figure verifies that the rate of the MF scheme and the upper bound increase with
the transmission power, and their gap is always less than 1/2. On the other hand, the rate of the
AF scheme approaches a constant of 1/2.
2) G-SDoF Comparison with AF: Since the rate gap between the MF and the AF schemes
can be arbitrarily large in the high SNR region, their G-SDoF should be different. Here, we
calculate the G-SDoF of the AF scheme to make a comparison. According to the definition in
(9), we can calculate the G-SDoF of the AF scheme as follows:
SDaf(ρ) = lim sup
SNR→∞
1
2
log
(
1 + P
2
s g1g2
σ2[Psg1+Psg2+Pdg2+σ2]
)− 1
2
log
(
1 + Psg1
Pdg2+σ2
)
log(SNR)
=
1
2
lim sup
SNR→∞
log
(
1 + SNR SNRg1g2
SNR(g1+g2)+INRg2
)
− log
(
1 + SNRg1
INRg2
)
log(SNR)
=
1
2
lim sup
SNR→∞
log
(
1 + SNR2−ρ g1g2
SNR1−ρ(g1+g2)+g2
)
− log
(
1 + g1
g2
SNR1−ρ
)
log(SNR)
=


ρ/2, If 0 ≤ ρ < 1
1− ρ/2, If 1 ≤ ρ < 2
0, If 2 ≤ ρ
. (20)
We plot the G-SDoF of AF and MF in Fig. 3 for an intuitive comparison. With reference
to (19), its first term, 1
2
log
(
1 + P
2
s g1g2
σ2[Psg1+Psg2+Pdg2+σ2]
)
, is a decreasing function of Pd while the
second term, −1
2
log
(
1+ Psg1
Pdg2+σ2
)
, is an increasing function of Pd. Hence, the destination needs
to carefully select an optimal value of Pd to maximize the rate Raf if all the channel information
is also available at the destination (this is the interference power dilemma). In the high SNR
regime, Pd is easier to calculate with reference to (20), i.e., Pd and Ps should have the same
order (ρ = 1).
3) Comparison with DF: In the AF and MF schemes, only symbol level time synchronization
is required at the multiple access phase. Currently, there is no capacity approaching DF scheme
under this assumption. In this part, we compare the MF scheme with the lattice based DF scheme
in [20], where perfect phase, amplitude and time synchronization between the interfering signal
and the source signal are assumed.
With reference to [20], setting h1 = h2, and Ps = Pd, the achievable rate of lattice DF scheme
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is
Rdf =
1
2
log
(
1
2
+
Psg1
σ2
)
− 1.
With the same channel coefficients, the MF scheme can also achieve a larger secure rate
even without such a strict synchronization requirement. The secrecy rate improvement can be
calculated as
Rs − Rdf =


0 If t ≤ 1
1
2
log(1 + t)− 1
2
If 1 < t ≤ 3/2
1
2
log
(
2 +
2
1 + 2t
)
If t > 3/2
, (21)
where t = Psg1/σ2 is the receiver side SNR. From (21), we can see that the gap will always
be larger than 0 for the non-trivial case. For the low SNR region, the improvement of the MF
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scheme could be significant since Rs/Rdf can goes to infinity6.
V. OUTAGE PERFORMANCE WITHOUT CSIT
In this section, we analyze the connection outage and secrecy outage performance of the MF
scheme under the assumption of only receiver side channel state information. Specifically, this
section consists of four parts: Part A presents the formulation of connection and secrecy outage
probabilities, as well as the generalized secure diversity; Parts B and C calculate a lower bound
and the achievable probability for the outage probabilities, as well as the secure diversity; and
Part D provides a comparison with the AF scheme.
6The achievable rate in [20] may be further improved with a better bounding technique. However, the MF scheme should
outperform it at least in the low SNR region.
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A. Outage Probabilities and Diversity
The metrics of secrecy capacity and secrecy outage have been widely investigated to measure
the performance of various schemes. However, they are not appropriate when the transmitter has
no channel state information. In many cases, such as the fast fading case [27], even the state
information of the source-destination channel is difficult to obtain at the transmitter. Of course,
with an untrusted channel state information provider, such as the relay in our system model,
other issues arise.
Without any CSIT, both the direct channel rate Rd and the secrecy rate Rs must be determined
before transmission. Thus, there is always the possibility of unsuccessful transmissions. There
are of two types of unsuccessful transmissions to consider: (1) secrecy outage, in which the
eavesdropper obtains some information about the confidential message; and (2) connection
outage, in which the destination fails to detect the mixed and confidential messages. We use
the C-S outage (connection outage and secrecy outage) probability to measure the system secure
performance [7]. We formulate the C-S performance as follows.
1) Outage Probabilities Formulation: To discuss the outage probabilities, we define three
events: (1) EA: secrecy outage occurs at the relay and no connection outage occurs at the
destination; (2) EB: connection outage occurs at the destination and no secrecy outage occurs
at the relay; and (3) EC : both connection outage and secrecy outage occur.
A connection outage event occurs when the receiver cannot correctly decode the received
message. The connection outage probability can be written as
pc,out = Pr(EB ∪ EC) = Pr(Cd < Rd). (22)
A secrecy outage event occurs when the eavesdropper can obtain some information about
the confidential message. This event happens when the total information the eavesdropper can
retrieve from the received message is more than the entropy of the random sequence. So, the
secrecy outage probability can be written as
ps,out = Pr(EA ∪ EC) = Pr(Rd − Rs < Cr) = Pr(Rs > Rd − Cr). (23)
Both pc,out and ps,out are of interest in this paper since the connection outage and secrecy
outage may be of different severities in various scenarios. For a given Rs, there is a tradeoff
between the connection outage probability and secrecy outage probability, since a large Rd will
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decrease the secrecy outage probability while increasing the connection outage probability, and
vice versa.
2) Definition of G-SDG: In the high SNR region, diversity order is a simple metric to
characterize the system performance. We now define the generalized secure diversity gain. Similar
to the generalized diversity gain defined in [28], the G-SDG is defined as
DG(ρ) = lim sup
SNR→∞
− log pt(SNR, ρ)
log(SNR)
(24)
where SNR = Ps/σ2, an exact expression for ρ = log(INR)/ log(SNR) are defined the same
as for the G-SDoF in (9), and pt is the total outage probability pt = Pr(EA)+Pr(EB)+Pr(EC).
B. Bounds on Outage Probabilities and Diversity Orders
This section develops a lower bound on the connection outage probability, an expression for
the secrecy outage probability, and an upper bound on the G-SDG, for any possible processing
at the relay node.
1) Lower Bound on Connection Outage: With reference to the definition in (22), a lower
bound on the connection outage probability can be obtained when the direct channel capacity
Cd is replaced with its upper bound 12 log(1+min{g1, g2}Ps/σ2). Then, we have a lower bound
on the connection outage probability as
plbc,out = Pr
(1
2
log(1 + min{g1, g2}Ps/σ2) < Rd
)
(25)
= Pr
(
min{g1, g2}Ps/σ2 < γo
)
, (26)
where γo = 22Rd − 1 is the SNR threshold associated with connection outage. We further derive
plbc,out as
plbc,out = 1− Pr
(
min{g1, g2}Ps/σ2 ≥ γo
)
(27)
= 1− Pr
(
g1 ≥ γoσ
2
Ps
)
Pr
(
g2 ≥ γoσ
2
Ps
)
(28)
= 1− e−( 1ε1+ 1ε2 )γoσ
2
Ps . (29)
where the last equation is obtained by noting the probability density functions fg1(x) = 1ε1 e
−
x
ε1
and fg2(x) = 1ε2 e
−
x
ε2 .
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2) Expression for the Secrecy Outage: The secrecy outage does not depend on the processing
at the relay node. Therefore, we do not need to provide a bound, but rather can deal with the
exact outage probability. With the secrecy outage probability definition in (23), we derive an
analytical expression for the secrecy outage probability as follows:
ps,out = Pr
(
Cr > Rd − Rs
)
= Pr
( Psg1
Pdg2 + σ2
> γs
)
, (30)
where γs = 22(Rd−Rs) − 1 is the secrecy outage SNR threshold. We further write ps,out as
ps,out = Pr
(
Psg1 > γsPdg2 + γsσ
2
)
= Pr
(
g1 >
γsPd
Ps
g2 +
γsσ
2
Ps
)
(31)
=
∫
∞
0
fg2(g2)
(∫ ∞
γsPd
Ps
g2+
γsσ2
Ps
fg1(g1)dg1
)
dg2.
Applying the probability density functions fg1(x) = 1ε1 e
−
x
ε1 and fg2(x) = 1ε2 e
−
x
ε2 in the above
equation, we can obtain an analytical expression of ps,out as follows:
ps,out =
1
ε2
e
−
γsσ
2
Psε1
∫
∞
0
e
−( 1
ε2
+
γsPd
Psε1
)g2dg2
=
Psε1
Psε1 + Pdε2γs
e
−
γsσ
2
Psε1 . (32)
By applying the approximation ex = 1 + x for small values of |x| again, we arrive at an
asymptotic expression for the secrecy outage probability with high transmit power Ps, namely
ps,out ≃ Psε1
Psε1 + Pdε2γs
(
1− γsσ
2
Psε1
)
. (33)
3) Upper Bound on G-SDG: According to the definition, an outage event occurs when either
a secrecy outage or a connection outage occurs. Therefore, we have a lower bound on the total
outage probability:
pt ≥ max{plbc,out, ps,out}. (34)
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With the generalized secure diversity gain defined in (24), we can then obtain an upper bound
on the G-SDG as
G-SDGup(ρ) = lim sup
SNR→∞
− log(max[plbc,out(SNR, ρ), ps,out(SNR, ρ)])
log(SNR)
(35)
= lim sup
SNR→∞
−max[log plbc,out(SNR, ρ), log ps,out(SNR, ρ)]
log(SNR)
(36)
= lim sup
SNR→∞
min[− log(( 1
ε1
+ 1
ε2
) γo
SNR
),− log( Psε1
Psε1+Pdε2γs
(1− γs
SNRε1
))]
log(SNR)
(37)
= min
[
1, lim sup
SNR→∞
− log( SNRε1
SNRε1+SNRρε2γs
)
log(SNR)
]
(38)
=


0 If ρ ≤ 1
ρ− 1 If 1 < ρ ≤ 2
1 If ρ > 2
. (39)
C. Achievable Outage Probabilities and Diversity
In this section, we first derive the probabilities pc,out and ps,out achievable with the MF scheme,
separately. With these probabilities, we then obtain the achievable generalized secure diversity
gain of the MF scheme. The achievable ps,out is the same as the expression in (32).
1) Achievable Connection Outage Probability: The achievable connection outage probability
can be written as
pc,out = Pr(Cd < Rd)
= Pr
[1
2
log2
(
1/2 +
Ps
σ2
g1g2
g1 + g2
)
< Rd
]
(40)
= 1− e−( 1ε1+ 1ε2 )
γ1σ
2
Ps
2γ1σ
2
Ps
√
ε1ε2
K1
( 2γ1σ2
Ps
√
ε1ε2
)
, (41)
where γ1 = γo − 1/2 and K1(x) denotes the first-order modified Bessel function of the second
kind, and the derivation from (40) to (41) is given in Appendix I.
By applying the approximation of K1(x) ≃ 1x and ex = 1+x for small values of |x|, we arrive
at an asymptotic expression for the connection outage probability with high transmit power Ps
as
pc,out ≃
( 1
ε1
+
1
ε2
)γ1σ2
Ps
. (42)
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2) Tradeoff between Achievable pc,out and ps,out: With reference to (32) and (41), we see that
the two probabilities are not independent. An increase in pc,out (ps,out) will lead to a decrease in
ps,out (pc,out), which is a tradeoff mentioned in [7]. With the given tradeoff, it would be interesting
to carefully design the rates Rs, Rd and the powers Ps, Pd to minimize the connection outage and
secrecy outage probabilities. In the following Fig. 5, we plot the tradeoff between the connection
outage and secrecy outage probabilities for a typical setting.
In the high SNR regime with large Ps/σ2, the tradeoff between the two probabilities is simpler.
Substituting (42) into (33), we obtain an explicit relation between ps,out and pc,out as
Psε1 + Pdε2γs
Psε1
ps,out +
γsε2
γ1(ε1 + ε2)
pc,out = 1. (43)
3) Achievable G-SDG: In this section, we first give an upper bound and a lower bound on the
total outage probability of the MF scheme. Fortunately, both bounds lead to the same G-SDG,
which is also the best diversity gain in theory.
Upper Bound and Lower Bound for Achievable pt:
It is difficult to directly calculate the total outage probability due to the dependence between
pc,out and ps,out. Therefore, we analyze an upper bound and lower bound on the total outage
probability, with the MF scheme. According to the definition, we can obtain an upper bound:
pt = Pr(EA) + Pr(EB) + Pr(EC) ≤ Pr(EA ∪ EC) + Pr(EB ∪ EC) (44)
= pc,out + ps,out ≤ 2max{pc,out, ps,out}. (45)
On the other hand, either secrecy outage or connection outage means the outage of the trans-
mission. Therefore, we have a lower bound:
pt ≥ max{pc,out, ps,out}. (46)
We can see that the lower bound is one-half of the upper bound.
Achievable G-SDG:
With the generalized secure diversity gain defined in (24), the diversity gain is the same for
both the upper bound and the lower bound on pt since they only differ by a constant coefficient,
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and it can be calculated as follows:
G-SDG(ρ) = lim sup
SNR→∞
− log(max[pc,out(SNR, ρ), ps,out(SNR, ρ)])
log(SNR)
(47)
= lim sup
SNR→∞
−max[log pc,out(SNR, ρ), log ps,out(SNR, ρ)]
log(SNR)
(48)
= lim sup
SNR→∞
min[− log(( 1
ε1
+ 1
ε2
) γ1
SNR
),− log( Psε1
Psε1+Pdε2γs
(1− γs
SNRε1
))]
log(SNR)
(49)
= min
[
1, lim sup
SNR→∞
− log( SNRε1
SNRε1+SNRρε2γs
)
log(SNR)
]
(50)
=


0 If ρ ≤ 1
ρ− 1 If 1 < ρ ≤ 2
1 If ρ > 2
. (51)
By comparing the upper bound on G-SDG in (35) and the achievable G-SDG in (47), we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The modulo-and-forward scheme achieves the full generalized secrecy diversity
gain for the untrusted relay channel.
D. Comparison with AF Scheme
This section compares the outage performance of the AF scheme with that of the MF scheme7.
Since the secrecy outage probability is independent of the forwarding strategy at the relay, we
need only to calculate the connection outage probability of the AF scheme, pAFc,out. From the
received end-to-end SNR expression for the AF relaying, we can derive the connection outage
probability as
pAFc,out = Pr
( P 2s g1g2
σ2[Psg1 + (Ps + Pd)g2 + σ2]
< γo
)
(52)
= 1− e− γoσ
2
Ps
(
(Ps+Pd)
Psε1
+ 1
ε2
)
2γoσ
2
Ps
√
1
ε1ε2
(Ps + Pd
Ps
+
1
γo
)
K1
(
2γoσ
2
Ps
√
1
ε1ε2
(Ps + Pd
Ps
+
1
γo
))
,
(53)
where the derivation from (52) to (53) is provided in Appendix II.
7The DF scheme is not compared since it cannot be adopted without CSIT.
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Fig. 5. Outage probabilities with MF and AF forwarding.
In Fig. 5, we plot the outage probability performance of the AF scheme and the MF scheme,
where we set Ps = Pd = 10, ε1 = ε2 = σ2 = 1, Rs = 1/2, and Rd varies from 1/2 to 15. We
can see that there is a tradeoff between the connection outage and secrecy outage probabilities
for both AF and MF schemes. However, the connection outage probability of the MF scheme is
almost half that of the AF scheme with the same Rd, indicating that MF scheme is much more
attractive for data transmission.
Secondly, we calculate the outage diversity gain of the AF scheme. When the SNR goes to
infinity, pAFc,out goes to zero only when ρ ≤ 2. In this case, the asymptotic expression can be
written as
pAFc,out ≃
γoσ
2
Ps
(
(Ps + Pd)
Psε1
+
1
ε2
)
.
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Similar to (47), we can calculate the outage diversity of the AF scheme as
DGaf (ρ) = − lim sup
SNR→∞
− log(max[pAFc,out(SNR, ρ), ps,out(SNR, ρ)])
log(SNR)
(54)
= min
[
lim sup
SNR→∞
− log
(
γo
SNR
( (SNR+SNRρ)
SNRε1
+ 1
ε2
))
log SNR
, lim sup
SNR→∞
− log( SNRε1
SNRε1+SNRρε2γs
)
log(SNR)
]
(55)
=


0 If ρ ≤ 1
ρ− 1 If 1 < ρ ≤ 1.5
2− ρ If 1.5 < ρ ≤ 2
0 If ρ ≥ 2
. (56)
Obviously, the maximum outage diversity of the AF scheme is 1/2, which is only half of that of
the MF scheme. Moreover, this diversity of 1/2 is achieved only when ρ = 3/2, which requires
very strict power control at the destination. These phenomena can be numerically observed in
Fig. 6, where a comparison of generalized secure diversity gain between the the AF and the MF
schemes is plotted.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the untrusted relay channel. Inspired by the MLAN channel,
we have proposed a modulo operation before forwarding at the relay, at which a lattice encoded
confidential message from the source and Gaussian distributed artificial noise from the destination
are superimposed. As a result, the artificial noise only helps to protect the confidential message
from eavesdropping at the untrusted relay, with almost no detrimental effect of wasted relay
power. For the case with full CSIT, we have shown that the proposed MF scheme approaches
the secrecy capacity within 1/2 bit for any channel realization, hence achieving full generalized
secure degrees of freedom. For the case without CIST, we have shown that the proposed MF
scheme achieves the full generalized secure diversity gain of 1. On the other hand, the traditional
AF scheme only achieves a G-SDG of 1/2 at most.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF EQ. (41)
From (40), we can write the achievable connection outage probability as
pc,out = Pr
[Ps
σ2
g1g2
g1 + g2
< γ1
]
, (A.1)
where γ1 = 22Rd − 1/2 is the target SNR threshold. We can further write po as
pc,out = Pr
(
g1g2 <
γ1σ
2
Ps
g1 +
γ1σ
2
Ps
g2
)
= Pr
[
g1(g2 − γ1σ
2
Ps
) <
γ1σ
2
Ps
g2
]
. (A.2)
Considering the two cases of g2 ≤ γ1σ2Ps and g2 >
γ1σ2
Ps
, we can rewrite pc,out as
pc,out = Pr
(
g2 ≤ γ1σ
2
Ps
)
+ Pr
(
g2 >
γ1σ
2
Ps
, g1 <
γ1σ2
Ps
g2
g2 − γ1σ2Ps
)
. (A.3)
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Applying the probability density functions fg1(x) = 1ε1 e
−
x
ε1 and fg2(x) = 1ε2 e
−
x
ε2 in the above
equation, we can obtain an analytical expression for the outage probability as
pc,out = Pr
(
g2 ≤ γ1σ
2
Ps
)
+
∫ γ1σ2Ps g2
g2−
γ1σ
2
Ps
0
fg1(g1) Pr
(
g2 >
γ1σ
2
Ps
)
dg1
= 1− 1
ε2
∫
g2=
γ1σ
2
Ps
e
−
(
1
ε2
+
γ1σ
2
Psε1(g2−
γ1σ
2
Ps
)
)
g2
dg2 (A.4)
= 1− e−( 1ε1+ 1ε2 )
γ1σ
2
Ps
2γ1σ
2
Ps
√
ε1ε2
K1
( 2γ1σ2
Ps
√
ε1ε2
)
. (A.5)
Thus, we have (41).
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF EQ. (53)
From (52), we can write the connection outage probability of AF relaying as
pAFc,out = Pr
(
P 2s g1g2 < Psσ
2γog1 + (Ps + Pd)σ
2γog2 + γoσ
4
) (B.1)
= Pr
[
(P 2s g2 − Psσ2γo)g1 < (Ps + Pd)σ2γog2 + γoσ4
]
. (B.2)
Considering the two cases of g2 ≤ γoσ2Ps and g2 > γoσ
2
Ps
separately, we can further write pAFc,out as
pAFc,out = Pr(g2 ≤
γoσ
2
Ps
) + Pr
(
g2 >
γoσ
2
Ps
, g1 <
γoσ
2
Ps
· (Ps + Pd)g2 + σ
2
Psg2 − γoσ2
)
(B.3)
= 1− 1
ε2
∫
∞
γoσ2
Ps
e
−
g2
ε2
−
γoσ
2
Psε1
·
(Ps+Pd)g2+σ
2
Psg2−γoσ
2 dg2. (B.4)
Using the variable substitution of x = g2− γoσ2Ps , we can obtain a closed-form expression for the
connection outage probability for the AF relaying as
pAFc,out = 1− e−
γoσ
2
Ps
(
(Ps+Pd)
Psε1
+ 1
ε2
)
2γoσ
2
Ps
√
1
ε1ε2
(Ps + Pd
Ps
+
1
γo
)
K1
(
2γoσ
2
Ps
√
1
ε1ε2
(Ps + Pd
Ps
+
1
γo
))
.
(B.5)
In this way, the proof of (53) has been completed.
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